

Contrarians and Volatility Clustering

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SFI WORKING PAPER: 1994-03-010

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Contrarians and Volatility Clustering

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ABSTRACT: We introduce a new origin of volatility clustering in economic time series generated by systems of interacting adaptive agents. Each agent is assigned a random subset of a fixed collection of predictors. At every time step each agent generates an action based upon its assigned predictors. Some agents are contrarians—i.e. they act at variance with the natural action suggested by a predictor. Agents that perform poorly are replaced. At each time step the signal value is generated solely by the cumulative actions of the agents on the current history of the time series. We observe numerically that under the dynamics induced by the removal of poor performers, even when contrarians are introduced at a very low density, the system evolves to a state in which contrarians comprise nearly half of the population. Furthermore, the time series generated by these systems exhibits volatility clustering. Elimination of either the contrarian behavior or the removal of poor players precludes volatility clustering.

Section 1: Introduction

Many time series in economics and finance exhibit a phenomenon called clustered volatility, which refers to signals which display high volatility during some intervals of time and low volatility at other times. Volatility clustering has been observed in stock returns and related derivative securities,^{1,2} interest rates,³ and foreign exchange rates.⁴ A variety of time series models have been constructed and used in these and other references in efforts to characterize such signals statistically. However, progress in understanding the origins of clustered volatility has been limited. A thorough survey of the literature describing both empirical evidence of clustered volatility and related statistical analysis is contained in Ref.[5].

In this paper we consider a class of adaptive systems which, through the actions of competing agents, self-organize to states in which time series with clustered volatility are generated. Like the systems in Ref.[6] which we discuss below, each new value of the signal is generated by the actions of players which make decisions based upon a set of prescribed predictors applied to the current history of the signal. However, the systems which we consider here have two additional features. First, contrarians—players which act “against” the natural action indicated by a predictor—are introduced. Also, players which perform poorly are replaced. This second feature provides for an evolutionary dynamics, which, in conjunction with contrarians, yields interesting behavior. In particular, we observe that even when contrarians are introduced at a low rate the systems equilibrate with densities of contrarians just under a half. Furthermore, the resulting signals exhibit regions of high and low volatility, i.e. clustered volatility. To the best of our knowledge this is a new mechanism for the origin of this phenomenon.

In addition to the purely academic pursuit of understanding the origin of clustered volatility, in finance there are countless practical applications of models which generate realistic signals. Statisticians and econometricians frequently use time series models to

capture relevant features of financial signals such as clustered volatility, and then apply the results to price derivative securities. However, such methods are intrinsically limited to the modelers ability to select a tractable class of time series models which estimates particular attributes of the financial signal to a reasonable degree of accuracy. Adaptive systems such as those discussed below could potentially be calibrated to model financial signals directly.

The systems that we examine here are motivated by the work of W. B. Arthur. In Ref.[7] Arthur suggests the importance of the formation of beliefs of economic agents in an inductive procedure, and he sketches a framework in which one could construct a population of “investors,” each formulating its current hypotheses about the present state of a market by applying a set of predictors on the history of a financial signal. The signal itself is generated by the actions of the investors, which are boundedly rational. This train of thought is one of a variety of suggested departures from equilibrium theory and the associated assumption of rational expectations, in which investors or agents solve optimization problems given prescribed probability distributions on future events. For a survey of work related to bounded rationality in economic systems see Ref.[8].

An exceedingly simple system which captures much of the essence of Ref.[7], was introduced by W. B. Arthur in Ref.[6]. Arthur describes the model in essentially the following way. A bar has 50 seats and a population of 100 people who consider patronizing the bar each night. Every individual is “happy” if it chooses to visit the bar on a night in which a total of 50 or fewer people arrive because the bar is not too crowded, and is “unhappy” if more than 50 people attend. A pool of M (say $M = 20$) *ad hoc* predictors is constructed. For example, predictors could be: (1) the same as last night; (2) the same as two nights ago; (3) a linear interpolate of the last three nights; and so on. Each individual is randomly assigned a subset of L ($1 \leq L \leq M$) of these predictors. The key feature of the system is that the attendance (signal) at time $n+1$ is generated solely by the responses of the players

to information contained in the signal up to time n . Specifically, to generate a signal at a given time step all predictors are evaluated over a window of, say, the last 100 time steps, and ranked according to the least square error in the predictions over this window. At each time every player uses the prediction generated by the best predictor (lowest error) *of the L that it has been assigned*. The decision of each player is to visit the bar if its best predictor predicts an attendance of 50 or fewer, or, conversely, to stay home if its best predictor anticipates attendance in excess of 50. Aggregate attendance is calculated, and this procedure is iterated.

This system clearly generates a stationary process. It is also clear that if $L = M$ then each player is in possession of all predictors, and the signal will bounce between full attendance and zero attendance since the actions of all players must coincide. The insight by Arthur is that if $L < M$ then the inhomogeneity of beliefs can yield a more interesting time series. A realization of the signal generated by a process which is essentially identical to the system described above with $M = 40$ predictors and each player holding $L = 5$ is shown in Figure 1 (a signal value of zero in the figure corresponds to the attendance of half of the players in the bar problem). Another observation by Arthur is that the system does not reach a trivial stationary state, in that the set of predictors being used in each time step does not reach a fixed point. This nontrivial aspect of the stationary state is a consequence of the fact that a good predictor is actively used by a large fraction of the population, which results in poor future performance.

The systems that we consider here will add two important features to the system above: contrarians and an evolutionary dynamics. These two elements are essential to the appearance of volatility clustering.

The fact that the signal becomes trivial when every player possesses all predictors in the system described above motivates the addition of contrarian strategies. Namely, if a given predictor has been the most successful at recent predictions (i.e. its error is smallest

among all predictors) then in the original system the preponderance of the population is using this predictor to make decisions. The exact fraction depends upon L and M in a simple way. It would clearly be advantageous for a player to use this predictor as a contrarian—i.e. to make a decision at variance with what the predictor suggests. This would result in visiting the bar during nights of low attendance, and staying home when it is crowded— at least while the system remains in this state where a large fraction of players are following the same predictor in the usual protrarian way.

The distinction between protrarians and contrarians is critical in what follows. Allowing contrarian behavior is *not* equivalent to doubling the predictor set. Specifically, a contrarian using a predictor is not the same as a protrarian using the reflection of the predictor, because the reflected predictor will have a high error when the original predictor has a low error. When a player is currently using its best predictor as a protrarian, it will attend if this predictor suggests a low turnout; if the best predictor is being used as a contrarian, the player will attend if this predictor suggests a high turnout. The effect on the success of the predictor is manifestly different in the two cases. The actions of protrarians undermine the success of a predictor, while contrarians enhance the success. In these systems if the best predictor happens to be used by nearly the same number of contrarians and protrarians, it can remain the best predictor for some time. Without contrarians this is not possible.

The second additional feature in these systems is an evolutionary dynamics: players that perform poorly (e.g. too often attend on busy nights and stay home on quiet nights) are replaced (see Ref.[9] for a discussion of evolution of strategies in a model of stock traders). It is this attribute that allows for interesting dynamics in the number of protrarians and contrarians using given predictors. Specifically, the density of contrarian strategies converges to values much higher than the density at which they are introduced. The signals that are generated by these systems are interesting in that clearly discernible

regions of high and low volatility can arise. Figure 2 contains a realization of such a time series for the system with $M = 40$ predictors, with each player holding $L = 25$. This value of L is much larger than for the systems which we discuss in detail later, and was selected here solely to make the volatility clustering clearly discernible.

In the next section we will describe the precise dynamics of the two systems. The third section describes results from simulations. Here we show realizations of the processes as the number of predictors assigned to each player varies, and as the probability of generating contrarians is adjusted. We will also show how the density of contrarian strategies converges to limiting values which are relatively independent of the rate at which contrarians are generated. In addition, we discuss the distributions of the signal values and block variances. Most importantly, we show plots of the conditional variance of the next signal value given the previous value. These plots establish the appearance of clustered volatility when contrarians are present.

Section 2: The Systems

The systems which we consider generate signals with values in the interval $[-1, 1]$. There will be a total of M possible predictors Φ_j , with $1 \leq j \leq M$, which are functions that map the history of the signal to the interval $[-1, 1]$:

$$\Phi_j : (\dots, X_{n-1}, X_n) \rightarrow [-1, 1] \quad (1)$$

These functions generate the predictions at each time step. Typically the Φ_j 's used in our simulations are generated randomly from some restricted class of functions (this results in a quenched disorder in the system). Each predictor Φ_j is also accompanied by an error denoted by e_j , the evolution of which will be described shortly.

The number of players in the game will be denoted by N . Each player is assigned L predictors. We will view each player as being defined by a vector of length L : (i_1, \dots, i_L) ,

where the magnitude of the entries prescribes the predictors and the sign indicates pro-trarian/contrarian modes. So, for example if $L = 3$ and a player is defined by the vector $(-3, 5, 8)$, then it has predictors 3, 5 and 8 at its disposal. It is a contrarian with respect to 3 and a pro-trarian with respect to 5 and 8. Initially, each player is generated by assigning L randomly selected predictors, and making each of the predictors contrarian with probability p_{con} . Here p_{con} is a parameter which denotes the probability that a newly assigned predictor will be used in contrarian mode. Note that p_{con} need not be, and in fact is typically very different from, the stationary density of predictors used by the players in contrarian mode, as will be seen later.

Based upon the actions of its predictors on the history (\dots, X_{n-1}, X_n) , each player i will adopt a state $s_i(n+1)$ which is either 1 or -1 (analogous to visiting the bar or staying home). This is done in the following way. Each player i selects the predictor with the lowest error from its available predictors $(\Phi_1^i, \dots, \Phi_L^i)$. This predictor, denoted by $\hat{\Phi}_n^i$, generates a prediction for the next value of the signal: $\tilde{X}_{n+1}^i = \hat{\Phi}_n^i[(\dots, X_{n-1}, X_n)]$. The player then acts in the following way:

- (A) If player i is *pro-trarian* with respect to $\hat{\Phi}_n^i$, then $s_i(n+1)$ takes the *opposite* sign of the prediction \tilde{X}_{n+1}^i .
- (B) If player i is *contrarian* with respect to $\hat{\Phi}_n^i$ then $s_i(n+1)$ takes the *same* sign of the prediction \tilde{X}_{n+1}^i .

Remark: (A) and (B) are analogous to the concept of each player visiting the bar (pro-trarian mode) or staying home (contrarian mode) when its active predictor predicts a less crowded night.

The value of the signal at the next time $t = n + 1$ is the average:

$$X_{n+1} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N s_i(n+1) \quad (2)$$

Once this new signal value is generated, two things must be done:

- (i) Players that did well during this time step are rewarded.
- (ii) The updated predictor errors must be calculated.

Regarding the first task (i), player i is considered to have “won” if $s_i(n+1)$ is of different sign than X_{n+1} . This is analogous to visiting the bar during a time of low attendance or staying home during a busy time. An important feature of these systems is that players that perform poorly are replaced. This can be done in a variety of ways without significant changes in the properties of the system. The method used in this paper is to prescribe a threshold integer θ . As the system evolves a counter is updated for each individual which denotes the difference between the number of “wins” and the number of “losses,” bounded in magnitude by θ . When an individual’s counter drops below $-\theta$ it is replaced with a randomly chosen set of L predictors, again with p_{con} the probability of a predictor being used in contrarian mode, and the counter is reset to zero.

To accomplish the second task (ii), the errors of the predictors are updated in the following way:

$$e_j(n+1) = \alpha e_j(n) + \beta_j(n+1) \quad (3)$$

where $0 < \alpha < 1$, and:

$$\beta_j(n+1) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \text{sign}\{\Phi_j[(\dots, X_{n-1}, X_n)]\} = \text{sign}(X_{n+1}) \\ 1 & \text{if } \text{sign}\{\Phi_j[(\dots, X_{n-1}, X_n)]\} \neq \text{sign}(X_{n+1}) \end{cases} \quad (4)$$

Therefore, predictor Φ_j is hurt by predicting a value of the wrong sign. The parameter α specifies the memory of the predictors. This Markovian form of the error update is particularly convenient both in simulation and analysis.

Section 3: Results from Simulations

For our simulations we restrict our attention to a class of *Linear Predictor Models* in which the predictors Φ_j are linear functions mapping a finite range R of the history of the

signal to a real number corresponding to the projected value of the signal in the next time step:

$$\Phi_j[(\dots, X_{n-1}, X_n)] = \sum_{k=1}^R \gamma_{jk} X_{n-k} \quad (5)$$

The coefficients γ_{jk} are generated randomly. For example, in our simulations discussed below these coefficients are selected independently from a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation 0.4 as the system is initialized, and remain fixed for the duration of the simulation. This space of possible predictors contains many of the *ad hoc* predictors used by Arthur.

Unless otherwise stated the following parameters are fixed:

- (i) The number of players: $N = 1001$.
- (ii) The number of predictors: $M = 40$.
- (iii) The range of the predictors: $R = 4$.
- (iv) The threshold for removal: $\theta = 100$.

Remark: The qualitative nature of the results does not seem to depend in any significant way on the precise values of these parameters. Furthermore, the phenomena described below are also observed in systems with predictors selected from different function spaces. For example, we have examined a class of systems with predictors selected from a class of nonlinear functions which act on only the last value of the signal ($R = 1$), and the qualitative behavior of these systems seems similar to that of the Linear Predictor Models discussed here.

The parameters which have a significant affect on the behavior of the systems are:

- (i) p_{con} : the probability of a newly assigned predictor being used in contrarian mode.
- (ii) L : the number of predictors assigned to each player.

The qualitative nature of the results is as follows. In the absence of contrarians (i.e. with $p_{con} = 0$) the signal does not exhibit clustered volatility. With contrarians ($p_{con} > 0$) the distribution of the number of predictors in contrarian mode increases from an initial density of p_{con} to a limiting value which is just under a half, and which is rather independent of the value of p_{con} . The time series generated by systems with $p_{con} > 0$ show clustered volatility to a degree which seems to increase with L .

Next we discuss the detailed results.

(A) *Sample Signals:* Figures 3 and 4 contain realizations of the time series generated by the system above for several parameter values. In Figures 3(a) and 3(b) we show the system where each player has $L=5$ predictors out of the 40 possible with $p_{con} = 0$ and $p_{con} = .5$ respectively. Note that in each case the signal seems roughly centered around zero. However, the standard deviation for the system with $p_{con} = 0$ is approximately 0.3458 while when $p_{con} = .5$ the standard deviation takes a much smaller value of 0.0201. In Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show the same plots for the system with $L = 15$. Once again the signals are roughly centered at zero, but have very different standard deviations—0.5835 and 0.0238 respectively. In each case visual comparison seems to point to more structure in the presence of contrarians.

(B) *Density of Contrarians and Equilibration:* Before discussing detailed statistics of the stationary processes generated by these systems we first mention an interesting feature which we use to ascertain if the systems have reached their stationary states. In Figures 5(a) and 5(b) we show the fraction of predictors used in contrarian mode as a function of time for the systems with $L = 5$ and $L = 15$ respectively for various values of p_{con} . This density of contrarians is calculated by averaging the fraction of predictors used in contrarian mode over consecutive time intervals of sizes $2^k 10^4$. An interesting feature is that the density converges to a limiting density which can be significantly different from the probability p_{con} that a newly generated player uses a predictor in contrarian

mode. When $p_{con} = .5$ the system *decreases* to an equilibrium density of contrarians which is approximately .489. The fact that the limiting density is less than .5 is a real feature and not merely a consequence of a finite number of players. When $p_{con} = .1$ the density increases to approximately .481. This increase is due to the fact that if protrarians abound, it is generally lucrative to be a contrarian. Consequently, when p_{con} is small but positive, prior to equilibration players removed due to poor performance are predominantly protrarian.

We use the convergence illustrated in Figure 5 as a criterion for the convergence of the system to its stationary state. When the density of contrarians stabilizes to within a given tolerance (.001) of the limiting value we begin generating our sample statistics.

(C) Distributions: We now discuss the distributions of the signal values and of the local variance. Figures 6(a) and 6(b) contain the empirical distribution of the signal values when $L = 5$ with $p_{con} = 0$ and $p_{con} = .5$ respectively. Figures 7(a) and 7(b) shows the same when $L = 15$. Note that the variance of the signal is reduced considerably by the presence of contrarians. The rapid change in monotonicity of the density shown in 6(b) and 7(b) is due to the discrete nature of the system and to the quenched disorder in the predictors. It is conceivable that averaging over the initial distribution of the random predictors would yield a smooth density. Figure 8(a) shows the stationary distribution of a local variance when $p_{con} = 0$ for $L = 5$ (solid) and $L = 15$ (dashed). By this we mean that the distribution of the variance of the time series over windows of 20 time steps is calculated. Figure 8(b) is the same when $p_{con} = .5$ for the two systems. Note that the increase in L from 5 to 15 results in a noticeable broadening of the distribution of the local variance. Also, note that the addition of contrarians reduces the variance significantly.

(D) Conditional Variances: One measure of how the variance of X_n depends upon the

history up to time $n - 1$ is:

$$\text{Var}[X_n|X_{n-1}] = E[X_n^2|X_{n-1}] - \left(E[X_n|X_{n-1}]\right)^2 \quad (6)$$

where $E[X_n|X_{n-1}]$ denotes the expectation of X_n conditional on the value of X_{n-1} . This conditional variance defined in (6) is a function of X_{n-1} and is a quantitative measurement of how the volatility of the upcoming value is conditionally dependent on the history of the signal.

Remark: The simplest time series models which utilize such conditional variances are the ARCH models¹⁰ in which:

$$X_n = \sigma_n Z_n \quad \sigma_n^2 = \beta_0 + \sum_{i=1}^q \beta_i X_{n-i}^2 \quad (7)$$

where Z_n are i.i.d. mean zero random variables. The main point is that the variance of the upcoming signal value depends on the history of the signal. If all of the β_i 's in (7) are positive and if the recent history of the time series was volatile (high values of X_{n-i}^2), then the variance of the upcoming value is high. Conversely, conditioning on low values of X_{n-i}^2 results in a diminished variance for the upcoming value. Such an ARCH process would, therefore, exhibit clustered volatility. In general, one must consider the variance of X_n conditioned upon the entire history of the signal, and, in fact, a major consideration in time series modeling is determining how far back the conditioning is pertinent.

The conditional variance with which we work is conditioning only on the last signal value—this will be more than adequate to illustrate interesting behavior. In Figures 9(a) and 9(b) we plot the conditional variance for the system with $L = 5$ and $p_{con} = 0$ and $p_{con} = 0.5$ respectively. Here $v_c(x) = \text{Var}[X_n|X_{n-1} = x]$ as defined in (6). Figures 10(a) and 10(b) are the same for the system with $L = 15$. The contrast between the (a) and (b) figures is striking. In the presence of contrarians it is clear that extreme values of X_{n-1} are associated with higher values of the variance of X_n . This is a manifestation

of clustered volatility— if one conditions on the current signal value being far from the unconditional mean (which is approximately zero) then the signal is currently “volatile,” and the upcoming value is of higher variance than without the conditioning. Without contrarians the opposite is true, with a suppressed variance when the current value is far from the origin.

(E) Scaling: Next we examine the partial sums of the signals: $S_n = \sum_{i=1}^n X_i$. In particular, we observe the scaling of $Var(S_n)$ for large n . Simulations indicate the usual diffusion scaling $Var(S_n) \sim \sigma n$. The value of σ changes both as L is changed as well as with the addition of contrarians. When $L = 5$: $p_{con} = 0$ results in $\sigma \approx .122$; $p_{con} = .5$ yields $\sigma \approx .0005$. For $L = 15$ the results are: $p_{con} = 0$ has $\sigma \approx .308$; $p_{con} = .5$ has $\sigma \approx .0009$.

Section 4: Conclusions

The results that we have presented here show that a variety of nontrivial time series can be generated from relatively simple systems. Of particular note is the appearance of clustered volatility when contrarian behavior and evolutionary dynamics is introduced. While the presence of clustered volatility in many financial signals is well established empirically, plausible mechanisms for its origin have been elusive.

The systems and results that we have discussed here are not to be taken as particularly realistic models of real economic agents. Rather, the fact that these simple adaptive systems can exhibit behavior which is observed in real economic signals and which is largely unexplained makes further work in this arena compelling. Analysis of such adaptive interacting systems will presumably require techniques outside of the realm of equilibrium theory. In these systems the agents do not reach a fixed point in the strategies that they adopt— the agents’ “perceptions” (primitive as they are) of their optimal strategies are evolving and highly coupled. The stationary behavior of these systems is characterized not by fixed probability distributions on future events and an optimal allocation of resources,

but by a stationary process on the (rather large) state space of the strategies used by each of the players.

There are many directions for future work. The tasks involved in analysis are challenging, even for the simple systems discussed here. However, it would be desirable to rigorously establish some attributes both of the stationary distribution of the players' strategies as well as of the resulting time series. There is also the appealing prospect of establishing interesting diffusion (continuous time) limits of the time series (e.g. as the number of players diverge). There are also a multitude of directions to explore in simulations by expanding the predictor set and the players' strategies for using them. On a purely statistical note, it would be interesting to consider how well common time series techniques such as ARCH or GARCH models do at fitting the signals generated by these adaptive systems. Perhaps the most practical endeavor will be to see just how useful these systems are in modeling real financial data.

Acknowledgements : The authors would like to thank W. B. Arthur, J. Carlson, M. Leibig, and S. Pepke for useful comments and discussions. In addition, P. Feldman, R. Feldman, S. Rachev, and D. Steigerwald provided helpful information on simulation and time series techniques. The work of ERG was supported by ONR grant N000014-91-J-1502 and by Los Alamos National Laboratories. The work of GHS was supported by NSF grant DMS-9305904.

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Figure Captions:

(1). Sample signal $x(t)$ of 500 time steps for systems with $L = 5$ predictors held by each player out of a possible 40 after equilibration of the system without contrarians ($p_{con} = 0$) and without removal ($\theta = \infty$).

(2). Sample signal $x(t)$ of 500 time steps for systems with $L = 25$ predictors held by each player out of a possible 40 after equilibration of the system with contrarians ($p_{con} = .5$) and with removal ($\theta = 100$).

(3). Sample signals $x(t)$ of 500 time steps for systems with $L = 5$ predictors held by each player out of a possible 40 after equilibration of the system. 3(a) is for the system with $p_{con} = 0$ (without contrarians); 3(b) is with $p_{con} = .5$. Note that the signal values $x(t)$ are reduced considerably with the addition of contrarians.

(4). Sample signal $x(t)$ of 500 time steps for systems with $L = 15$ predictors held by each player out of a possible 40 after equilibration of the system. 4(a) is with $p_{con} = 0$; 4(b) is with $p_{con} = .5$. As in Figure 3 the amplitude of $x(t)$ is reduced considerably by contrarians. In addition, comparison with Figure 3 shows that larger values of L are associated with a higher variance in $x(t)$.

(5). The ratio $c(t)$ of number of predictors held in contrarian mode to the total number of predictors held (LM) averaged over consecutive time intervals of length $t = 2^k \times 10^4$ for integer k . Figure 5(a) is with $L = 5$. Squares show the trace when $p_{con} = .5$, crosses when $p_{con} = .3$ and diamonds when $p_{con} = .1$. Note that for these very different values of p_{con} , the equilibrium density of contrarians is nearly the same and is less than .5. Figure 5(b) is the same as 5(a) for the system with $L = 15$. Note the much slower rate of convergence when $p_{con} = .1$.

(6). The stationary probability density $f(x)$ of the signal values when $L = 5$. 6(a) is with $p_{con} = 0$; 6(b) is with $p_{con} = .5$. The lack of smoothness of the density in 6(b) is an

attribute of the discrete nature of the system— both in the number of players and in the number of strategies.

(7). The stationary probability density $f(x)$ of the signal values when $L = 15$. 7(a) is with $p_{con} = 0$; 7(b) is with $p_{con} = .5$. Note the striking change in appearance of $f(x)$ with $p_{con} = 0$ as L is increased from 5 to 15 (compare 6(a) and 7(a)).

(8). The stationary probability density $f(v)$ of the signal variance over blocks of 20 time steps. 8(a) is with $p_{con} = 0$: the solid plot is $L = 5$ and the dashed plot is $L = 15$. 8(b) is the same with $p_{con} = .5$.

(9). The conditional variance $v_c(x) = Var[X_n|X_{n-1} = x]$ when $L = 5$. 9(a) is with $p_{con} = 0$; 9(b) is with $p_{con} = .5$. The addition of contrarians results in a clearly enhanced volatility at extreme values of x —i.e. clustered volatility. Without contrarians 9(a) shows a reduced volatility for extreme values of x .

(10). The conditional variance $v_c(x)$ when $L = 15$. 10(a) is with $p_{con} = 0$; 10(b) is with $p_{con} = .5$. The addition of contrarians and the large value of L results in an even more striking display of clustered variance than in 9(b).




Figure 1




Figure 2





Figure 3







Figure 4



(a)



(b)

Figure 5





Figure 6





Figure 7




Figure 8





Figure 9





Figure 10