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On the origin of power law tails in price fluctuations

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In a recent Nature paper, Gabaix et al. \([1]\) presented a theory to explain the power law tail of price fluctuations. The main points of their theory are that volume fluctuations, which have a power law tail with exponent roughly \(-1.5\), are modulated by the average market impact function, which describes the response of prices to transactions. They argue that the average market impact function follows a square root law, which gives power law tails for prices with exponent roughly \(-3\). We demonstrate that the long-memory nature of order flow invalidates their statistical analysis of market impact, and present a more careful analysis that properly takes this into account. This makes it clear that the functional form of the average market impact function varies from market to market, and in some cases from stock to stock. In fact, for both the London Stock Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange the average market impact function grows much slower than a square root law; this implies that the exponent for price fluctuations predicted by modulations of volume fluctuations is much too big. We find that for LSE stocks the distribution of transaction volumes does not even have a power law tail. This makes it clear that volume fluctuations do not determine the power law tail of price returns.

Gabaix et al. \([1]\) have recently proposed a testable theory for the origin of power law tails in price fluctuations. In essence, their proposal is that they are driven by fluctuations in the volume of transactions, modulated by a deterministic market impact function. More specifically, they argue that the distribution of large trade sizes scales as \(P(V > x) \sim x^{-\gamma}\), where \(V\) is the volume of the trade and \(\gamma \approx 3/2\). Based on the assumption that agents are profit optimizers, they argue that the average market impact function\(^1\) is a deterministic function of the form \(r = kV^\beta\), where \(r\) is the the change in the logarithm of price resulting from a transaction of volume \(V\), \(k\) is a constant, and \(\beta = 1/2\). This implies that large price returns \(r\) have a power law distribution with exponent \(\alpha = \gamma/\beta \approx 3\). They argue that their theory is consistent with the data, even though these results are inconsistent with several other previous studies \([2-4]\) in the same markets they study (the New York and Paris Stock Exchanges).

I. PROBLEMS WITH THE TEST OF GABAIX ET AL.

Gabaix et al. \([1]\) present statistical evidence that appears to show that the NYSE and Paris data are consistent with the hypothesis that the average market impact follows a square root law. In this section we show that their test fails to take into account the long-memory properties of the data. This dramatically weakens their test, so that it lacks the power to reject reasonable alternative hypotheses and gives misleading results.

Their method to test the hypothesis of square root price impact is to investigate \(E[r^2|V]\) over a given time interval, e.g. 15 minutes, where \(r\) is the price shift and \(V = \sum_{i=1}^{M} V_i\) is the sum of the volumes of the \(M\) transactions occurring in that time interval. They have chosen to analyze \(r^2\) rather than \(r\) because of its properties under time aggregation. To see why this might be useful, assume the return due to each transaction \(i\) is of the form \(r_i = k\epsilon_i V_i^\beta + u_i\), where \(u\) is an IID noise process that is uncorrelated with \(V_i\), and \(\epsilon_i\) is the sign of the transaction. The squared return for the interval is then of the form

\[
r^2 = \sum_{i=1}^{M} \sum_{j=1}^{M} (k\epsilon_i V_i^\beta + u_i)(k\epsilon_j V_j^\beta + u_j)
\]

Under the assumption that \(V_i, V_j, \epsilon_i,\) and \(\epsilon_j\) are all uncorrelated, when \(\beta = 1/2\) it is easy to show that \(E[r^2|V] = a + b V\), where \(a\) and \(b\) are constants.

The problem is that for the real data \(V_i, V_j, \epsilon_i,\) and \(\epsilon_j\) are strongly correlated, and indeed, the sequence of signs \(\epsilon_i\) is a long-memory process \([5, 6]\). To demonstrate the gravity of this problem, we use real transactions \(V_i\), but introduce an artificial and deterministic market impact function of the form \(r_i = k\epsilon_i V_i^\beta\) with \(\beta \neq 0.5\). We first fix the number of transactions, and then repeat the same procedure using a fixed time period. We examine blocks of trades with \(M\) transactions, \(\{\epsilon_i, V_i\}\), \(i = 1, ..., M\), where \(\epsilon_i = +1 (-1)\) for buyer (seller) initiated trades and \(V_i\) is the volume of the trade in number of shares. For each trade we create an artificial price return \(r_i = k\epsilon_i V_i^\beta\), where \(k\) is a constant. Then for each block of \(M\) trades we compute \(r = \sum_{i=1}^{M} r_i = k \sum_{i=1}^{M} \epsilon_i V_i^\beta\) and \(V = \sum_{i=1}^{M} V_i\). Since we are using the real order

\(^1\) One should more properly think of the market impact as a response to the order initiating the trade. That is, in every transaction there is a just-arrived order that causes the trade to happen, and this order tends to alter the best quoted price in the direction of the trade, e.g. a buy order tends to drive the price up, and a sell order tends to drive it down.
flow we are incorporating the correct autocorrelation of the signs $e_i$ and transaction sizes $V_i$. Figure 1(a) shows $E[r^2|V]$ for different values of $M$ and $\beta = 0.3$ for the British stock Vodafone in the period from May 2000 to December 2002, a series which contains approximately $10^6$ trades. We see that for small values of $M$ the quantity $E[r^2|V]$ follows the artificial market impact functional form $E[r^2|V] \sim V^{2\beta} = V^{0.6}$, but when $M$ is large the relation between $E[r^2|V]$ and $V$ becomes linear. The value $M = 40$ is roughly the average number of trades in a 15 minute interval. We also show error bars computed as specified by Gabaix et al. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of a linear relation between $E[r^2|V]$ and $V$ with 95% confidence, even though we have a large amount of data, and we know by construction that $\beta$ is quite different from 1/2.

One can ask whether it makes a difference that we used a fixed number of transactions rather than a fixed time interval. To test this we repeat the procedure using a fixed time interval of 15 minutes. Figure 1(b) shows the result. We see an even clearer linear relation between $E[r^2|V]$ and $V$ than before, so that the test once again fails.

Why doesn’t this test work? To gain some understanding of this, we repeat the same test but shuffle the order of the data, which breaks the correlation structure. As shown in Figure 1(c), the result in this case is far from linear even when $M = 40$, and the test easily shows that the market impact does not follow a square root law. Thus, we see that the problem lies in the autocorrelation structure of the real data.

In conclusion our numerical simulations show that the linearity test of $E[r^2|V]$ lacks power to test for a square root market impact with data containing the correlation structure of real data. In fact, even a deterministic market impact like $r \sim V^{0.3}$ is consistent with the relation $E[r^2|V] = a + b V$ for a sufficiently large number of trades. Doing this for a fixed time interval rather than a fixed number of trades time makes this even more evident. Thus the Gabaix test provides no evidence that the average market impact follows a square root law.

II. PLACING ERROR BARS ON THE AVERAGE MARKET IMPACT

While there have been many previous studies of average market impact, they have not included the statistical analysis needed to assign good error bars. In this section we present results about average market impact at the level of individual ticks. We show that it does not generally follow a square root law, and that it varies from market to market and in some cases from stock to stock in a substantial and statistically significant way.

Realistic error bars for the average market impact are difficult to assess due to the fact that volatility is a long-memory process [7, 8]. That is, its time series has a slowly decaying power law autocorrelation function that

FIG. 1: A demonstration that the statistical test of Gabaix et al. [1] fails due to the strong autocorrelations in real data. The expected value of the squared price return, $E[r^2|V]$, is plotted as a function of total transaction size $V = \sum_{i=1}^{M} V_i$, where $V_i$ is the size of transaction $i$. Each transaction causes a simulated market impact of the form $r_i = k\epsilon_i V_i^{\beta}$, to generate total return $r = \sum_{i=1}^{M} r_i$. The transaction series $V_i$ and $\epsilon_i$ are from the real data of the British stock Vodafone, and contain roughly $10^6$ events. The error bars are the 95% confidence intervals computed following the procedure specified by Gabaix et al. (a) shows the results for a fixed number of transactions, with $M$ varying from 2 to 40; the curves are in ascending order of $M$; (b) is the same using a fixed time interval of 15 minutes, with variable $M$; and (c) is the same as (a) with the order of the transactions randomly shuffled. For (a) and (b) we see straight lines for large $M$, indicating that the test is passed, even though by construction the market impact does not follow the $r \sim V^{0.5}$ hypothesis, whereas for the shuffled data the test quite clearly shows us that the hypothesis is false.
is asymptotically of the form $\tau^{-\kappa}$, with $\kappa < 1$ so that the integral is unbounded. This makes error analysis complicated, since data from the distant past have a strong effect on data in the present. Because volatility is long-memory, the price returns that fall in a given volume bin $V_a$, which are by definition all of the same sign, are also long-memory. This means that the errors in measuring market impact are much larger than one would expect from intuition based on an IID hypothesis.

We analyze the market impact only for orders (or portions of orders) that result in immediate transactions. Each transaction $V_i$ generates a price return $r_i = \log p_a - \log p_a$, where $p_a$ is the midpoint price quote just before the transaction and $p_a$ is the midpoint price quote just after. We analyze buy and sell orders separately. The LSE has the advantage that the data set contains a record of orders, and so we can distinguish buy and sell orders unambiguously; for the NYSE data we use the trades and quotes to infer this using the Lee and Ready algorithm [9]. To estimate the average market impact we sort the events $(V_i, r_i)$ with the same sign $e_i$ into bins based on $V_i$ and plot the average value of $V_i$ for each bin against the average value of $r_i$, as shown in Figure 2. We choose the bins so that each bin has roughly the same number of points in it.

To assign error bars for each bin we use the variance plot method [7]. For each bin we split the events into $m$ subsamples with $n = K/m$ points, where $K$ is the number of records in the bin. The subsamples are chosen to be blocks of values adjacent in time. For each subsample $i$ we compute the mean $\mu_i^{(n)}$, $i = 1, \ldots, m$. Then we compute the standard deviation of the $\mu_i^{(n)}$ which we indicate as $\sigma^{(n)}$. By plotting $\sigma^{(n)}$ versus $n$ in a log-log plot we compute the Hurst exponent $H$ by fitting the data with a power-law function $\sigma^{(n)} = A n^{H-1}$. We compute the error in the mean of the entire sample of $K$ points by extrapolating the fitted function to the value $m = K$, i.e. $\sigma = A K^{H-1}$ where $A$ and $H$ are the ordinary least square estimate of the parameters $A$ and $H$. Interestingly, for smaller values of $V_i$ we find Hurst exponents substantially larger than 1/2, whereas for large values of $V_i$ the Hurst exponents are much closer to 1/2. When $H > 1/2$ the error bars are typically much larger than standard errors\(^2\).

In Figure 2 we show empirical measurements of the average market impact for the New York Stock Exchange and for the London Stock Exchange. We consider three highly capitalized stocks for each exchange, Lloyds (LLOY), Shell (SHEL) and Vodafone (VOD) for the LSE, and General Electric (GE), Procter & Gamble (PG) and AT&T (T) for the NYSE. For LSE stocks we consider the period May 2000- December 2002, while for NYSE stocks we consider the time period 1995-1996. The data for the NYSE are consistent with results reported earlier without error bars [3], while the LSE market impact data is new. The NYSE data clearly do not follow a power law across the whole range, consistent with earlier results in references [2, 3]. While $\beta(V_i) \approx 0.5$ for small $V_i$, for larger $V_i$ it appears that $\beta(V_i) < 0.2$. As shown in reference [3], this transition occurs for smaller values of $V_i$ for stocks with lower capitalization. Thus, the assumption that $\beta = 0.5$ breaks down for high volumes, precisely where it is necessary in order for the theory of Gabaix et al. to hold. For the London data the power law assumption seems more justified across the whole range, but the exponent is too low; a least squares fit gives $\beta \approx 0.26$. While we have not attempted to compute error bars for the regression, a visual comparison with the error bars of the individual bins makes it quite clear that $H = 1/2$ is inconsistent with either the London or the NYSE data. It is also clear that the average market impact functions are qualitatively different for LSE and NYSE stocks, and that for NYSE stocks the functional form varies with market capitalization [3].

Even if we abandon the prediction that the average market impact is a square root law, one might imagine

\(^2\) Since we choose the bins to have roughly the same number of points, the difference in Hurst exponent between bins with large and small $V$ cannot be due to a difference in the mean interval between samples.
that we could explain fluctuations in prices in terms of fluctuation in volume modulated by average market impact of the form \( r_i = kV_i^\beta \). However, if this were true, for the NYSE the predicted exponent for price fluctuations would be \( \alpha = \gamma/\beta \approx 1.5/0.25 = 6 \), which is much too large to agree with the data. (A typical value \([10]\) is \( \alpha \approx 3 \)). To make matters even worse, the power law hypothesis for volume or market impact appears to fail in some other markets. In the Paris Stock Exchange Bouchaud et al. \([4]\) have suggested that the average market impact function \( \beta \) is of the form \( \log V_i \), yielding \( \beta \to 0 \) in the limit as \( V_i \to \infty \). For the London Stock Exchange the power law hypothesis for average market impact seems reasonable, but with an exponent significantly smaller than 1/2. Moreover, the volume is not power law distributed, as discussed in the next section.

Note that we are making all the above statements for individual transactions, whereas many studies have been done based on aggregated data over a fixed time interval. Aggregating the data in time complicates the discussion, since the functional form of the market impact generally depends on the length of the time interval. Hence it is more meaningful to do the analysis based on individual transactions.

### III. VOLUME DISTRIBUTION

The theory of Gabaix et al. explains the power law of returns in terms of the power law of volume, so if volume doesn’t have a power law, then returns shouldn’t either. The existence of a power law tail for volume seems to vary from exchange to exchange. For the NYSE we confirm the observation of power law tails for volume reported earlier \([11]\). However in Figure 3 we show the distribution of volumes for three stocks in the LSE. In order to compare different stocks we normalize the data by dividing by the sample mean for each stock. All three stocks have strikingly similar volume distributions; this is true for the roughly twenty stocks that we have studied. There is no clear evidence for power law scaling, even though the power law scaling of the corresponding return distributions shown in Figure 3(b) is rather clear. If one attempts to fit lines to the larger volume range of the curve (roughly \( 10^1 - 10^2 \)), the exponent of the cumulative distribution corresponding to Figure 3(a) is highly uncertain but it is at least 3, which together with the measured values of \( \beta \) would imply \( \alpha \approx 3/0.3 \approx 10 \). In contrast, the measured exponents for Figure 3(b) are roughly 2.2, 2.5, and 4.3 for SHEL, LLOY, and VOD respectively. It is noteworthy that VOD has a much larger \( \alpha \) than the other stocks, even though it has essentially the same volume distribution and a similar volume distribution; if anything from Figure 2 it’s \( \beta \) is larger than that of the other stocks, which according to \( \alpha = \gamma/\beta \) would imply a smaller \( \alpha \). This provides yet more evidence that the power law tails of returns are not driven by those of volume.

\[ \frac{P(x)}{x^\alpha} = C \] for the NYSE the logarithmic form for average market impact is a reasonable approximation for small \( V_i \), but breaks down for higher \( V_i \).
IV. CONCLUSION

We have shown that the conclusions of Gabaix et al. [1] are invalid for three different reasons: First, their statistical analysis in claiming the existence of a square root law for average market impact is invalid for the strong autocorrelations that are present in real data; Second, new measurements of the average market impact with proper error bars show that it does not follow a square root law; Third, for the London Stock Exchange the distribution of volumes does not have a power law tail, and there are substantial variations between the return distributions that are not reflected in variations in volume or average market impact. Thus, it seems quite clear that the distribution of large price fluctuations cannot be explained as a simple transformation of volume fluctuations.

This leaves open the question of what really causes the power law tails of prices. We believe that the correct explanation lies in the extension of theories based on the stochastic properties of order placement and price formation [12–14], which naturally give rise to fluctuations in the response of prices to orders. Further work is clearly needed.

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